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1961] COMMENTS
Business Records in Louisiana as an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule
Business records are extra-judicial statements, and are there-
fore excludable as hearsay if offered to prove the facts con-
tained in them,' unless one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
can be invoked. 2 The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the
admissibility of business records in evidence in Louisiana under
exceptions to the hearsay rule peculiarly applicable to such
records. Business records may be admissible under common
law exceptions to the hearsay rule not confined to business rec-
ords - such as declarations against interest,8 admissions of a
party,4 and past recollections recorded5 - and under special Lou-
isiana statutes - such as those relating to proces verbal, 6 charity
and veterans hospital records, 7 and other official records.8 How-
1. 2 JONES, EVIDENCE 550, § 289 (5th ed. 1958). Business records may not be
hearsay if used for their non-assertive value, such as proof of verbal acts or
operative facts. For a discussion of hearsay in Louisiana, see Comment, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 611 (1954).
2. Professor Wigmore lists fourteen exceptions. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 208-09,
§ 1426 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See McCORMICx, EVIDENCE 546-54, §§ 253-57 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
259-90, §§ 1455-77 (3d ed. 1940).
4. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 502-45, §§ 239-52 (1954). It should be noted
that Professor Wigmore does not consider admissions of a party as an exception
to the hearsay rule; he considers such evidence admissible because the hearsay
rule is "satisfied." See 4 WIGMOEE, EVIDENCE 2-5, § 1048 (3d ed. 1940). For
rules applicable in Louisiana criminal cases see LA. R.S. 15:449-450, 454 (1950).
5. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 590-95, §§ 276-80 (1954). This is the rule
normally used to admit business records in evidence when the persons concerned
with making the particular entries are available for testimony.
6. LA. R.S. 15:35 (1950) provides in part: "Upon the trial of the case the
proc~s verbal of the inquest shall be competent evidence of death and the cause
thereof, but not of any other fact." (As amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 150, § 1;
La. Acts 1956, No. 425, § 1).
7. LA. R.S. 13:3714 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 519, § 1: "When-
ever a certified copy of the chart or record of either of the charity hospitals of
this state and any of the veterans hospitals in the state of Louisiana, signed by
the director, assistant director, superintendent or secretary of the hospital in
question, is offered in evidence in any court of competent jurisdiction, it shall be
received in evidence in such court, as prima facie proof of its contents, provided
that the party against whom the said record is sought to be used shall have the
right to summon and examine those making the original of said record as wit-
nesses under cross-examination."
Before legislation preceding this statute was passed (La. Acts 1936, No. 108,
and La. Acts 1938, No. 90, § 1), hospital records were inadmissible as hearsay.
Gaines v. Acme Industrial Life Ins. Soc., 155 So. 276 (La. App. 1934) ; Williams
v. Locicero, 142 So. 856 (La. App. 1932) ; Dolan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
123 So. 379 (La. App. 1929). An exception was made in workmen's compensa-
tion cases. Abelleira v. Johnson Iron Works Co., 137 So. 908 (La. App. 1931)
Harrison v. Joseph Rathbone Lumber Co., 132 So. 797 (La. App. 1931).
This statute allows charity hospital records to be admitted as prima facie
evidence. State v. Kelly, 237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959) ; Futrell v. Pacific
Indemnity Co., 79 So.2d 903 (La. App. 1955). However, statutory requirements
must be strictly adhered to. Fenerty v. Culotta, 80 So.2d 537 (La. App. 1955) ;
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ever, these rules are outside the scope of this Comment. It is
hoped that this study will be of some value in drafting a projet
for a Louisiana Code of Evidence. Instruction to prepare such
a code has been given to the Louisiana State Law Institute by
the legislature."
Before turning to Louisiana law, it will be useful to discuss
briefly the common law exceptions peculiar to business records-
the shop book rule, and the regular entries in the course of busi-
ness exception.
Common Law Rules for Business Records
The shop book rule was developed in England in the seven-
teenth century and was later adopted in the United States. Its
purpose was to allow small shopkeepers and craftsmen who kept
their own books to use them as proof of debts owed on open
account, and thereby avoid the harshness of the rule which pro-
hibited a party from testifying in his own behalf.1 0 In time, there
developed many technical and inflexible requirements apparently
in an effort to insure that the entries were trustworthy and that
their admission into evidence was a matter of some necessity.
Among these requirements were the following: (1) the party
must file a "suppletory" oath, (2) the books must bear an honest
appearance, (3) witnesses must testify from actual dealings
Sampson v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 175 So. 148 (La. App. 1937).
For a general discussion of hospital records as evidence, see Hale. Hospital
Records as Evidence, 14 So. CALIF. L. REV. 99 (1941) and McCormick, The Use
of Hospital Records as Evidence, 26 TuL. L. REV. 371 (1952). Professor Wig-
more advocates an exception to the hearsay rule for hospital records. 6 WIOME,
EVIDENCE 36, § 1707 (3d ed. 1940). Hospital records are admissible under the busi-
ness entries exceptions in the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514, and the UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE rules 62(6) and 63(13).
8. See LA. R.S. 3:3711 (1950) : "Copies of any books, records, papers or
other documents of any of the executive and administrative departments, boards,
and agencies of this state, and copies of any books, records, papers, or other docu-
ments of any of the political corporations, bodies politic, boards, departments
and agencies of this state and the parishes and municipalities thereof, when certi-
fied as being true copies by the official, officer or employee in whose custody
they may be, shall be admitted in evidence in all courts of this state, equally with
the originals of such books, records, papers or other documents." See also LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1394 (1960).
See also LA. R.S. 13:3712(A) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 316,
§ 1: "Certified copies of books, records, papers or other documents provided in
R.S. 13:3711 shall be prima facie proof of the existence and contents of the
originals and of any act, transactions or occurrence or event as a memorandum
of which such books, records, papers or documents were kept or made."
9. La. Acts 1956, No. 87, § 2: "The Louisiana State Law Institute is instructed
to prepare a comprehensive projet for a Louisiana Code of Evidence, covering
the rules of evidence for both criminal and civil cases."
10. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 597, § 282 (1954); 5 WioMooR, EVIDENCE:
347-48, § 1518 (3d ed. 1940).
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that the party is an honest bookkeeper, (4) the records must
have been made regularly, (5) the rule was applicable only to
proof of open accounts for goods and services furnished the
defendant, (6) other proof of actual delivery of part of the
goods must be made, and (7) the party must not have had a
bookkeeper." Abolition of the rule that a party cannot testify
in his own behalf and development of the broader regular entries
in the course of the business exception have removed the need
for the shop book rule. 1 2 Accordingly, in England the shop book
rule has been absorbed by the regular entries exception, but
courts in the United States continue to refer to it, with resulting
confusion. 3
The regular entries in the course of business exception de-
veloped later than the shop book rule and is much broader in
scope. This exception governs admissibility in evidence of third
parties' books as well as those of individual parties. Necessity
and reliability, the two basic principles of most hearsay excep-
tions, form the basis for the regular entries exception. This ex-
ception may be succinctly stated as follows: A permanent record
made in the ordinary course of business, by a person unavailable
for testimony, from personal knowledge of the facts recorded
or from information furnished by one having a business duty
to observe and report the facts, is admissible as proof of the
facts recorded, in the absence of a strong motive to misrepresent,
if the record is the first collected and recorded memorial.14
Louisiana Criminal Cases
Soon after Louisiana became one of the United States, its
courts accepted the common law rules of evidence' 5 which were
used in criminal as well as civil cases, except as modified by
11. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 597, § 282 (1954) ; 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
394-414, §§ 1536-58 (3d ed. 1940).
12. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 598, § 282 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 415-18,
§ 1560 (3d ed. 1940).
13. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 298, § 282 (1954) ; 5 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE 351,
418-20, §§ 1518, 1561 (3d ed. 1940).
14. See generally MCCORMICKc, EVIDENCE 596-613, §§ 281-90 (1954) ; 5 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE 347-94, §§ 1517-33 (3d ed. 1940).
15. See Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 568 (1954), which reaches this
conclusion, pointing out that the common law rules of evidence were adopted by
the Crimes Act of 1805 for the prosecution of crimes therein enumerated, and
that in civil cases the Spanish rules of evidence had been repealed by common
consent, as held in Planters Bank v. George, 6 Mart.(O.S.) 670 (La. 1819)..
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statute.'6 The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 19281T
codified, and to some extent modified, these rules in criminal
cases. Article 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Code." Since no provision is found in the Code for
admissibility of business records, it is arguable that business
records are inadmissible because they are hearsay. No con-
sideration of this contention has been found in appellate opin-
ions. Also, the exception for former testimony is well recognized
in Louisiana although no provision is made for it in the Code
of Criminal Procedure."8 However, no Louisiana criminal cases
have been found admitting business records, except under special
statutes, that is, those governing the admissibility of public
records, 9 charity hospital records, 20 and proces verbal. 21 Two
Louisiana criminal cases hold business records inadmissible,
relying in part upon common law authorities and reasons, but
no general rule can be drawn from them. In both of these cases
the records were excluded because it was not shown that the
bookkeeper was unavailable for testimony, nor that the entries
were made from first-hand knowledge. 22
Louisiana Civil Cases - Influence of the Civil Code
Article 230 of the Civil Code of 180823 provided that a mer-
16. See Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 568, 570 (1954) "(T] he courts
continued to apply common law evidence rules in all proceedings until the adop-
tion of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1928."
17. Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.
18. See Comment, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 146 (1959).
19. E.g., State v. Kelly, 237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959) (police stolen car
report held admissible because an official record). See LA. R.S. 13:3711-12
(1950), quoted in note 8 supra.
20. E.g., State v. Kelly, 237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959) (record of charity
hospital held admissible under LA. R.S. 13:3714 (1950), quoted in note 7 supra.)
21. E.g., State v. Wilburn, 196 La. 113, 198 So. 765 (1940) ; State v. Hayden,
171 La. 495, 131 So. 575 (1930). See LA. R.S. 15:35 (1950), quoted in note 6
supra.
22. In State v. Savage, 213 La. 1011, 36 So.2d 20 (1948), records of a live-
stock auction barn were held inadmissible in a prosecution for theft of a cow
because the records were not identified at the trial by the person making the
records and the entries were not shown to have been made from first-hand knowl-
edge. The court cited LA. R.S. 15:434, 436 (1950) as well as WHARTON, CRIM-
INAL EVIDENCE and C.J.S.
In State v. Goldstein, 187 La. 353, 174 So. 873 (1937), the books of the de-
fendant, a second-hand dealer being prosecuted for receiving stolen goods, were
held inadmissible when identified at the trial only by his wife, because (1) the
bookkeeper was not shown to be unavailable, (2) the witness was not familiar
with the bookkeeping procedure, and (3) the entries were not shown to have been
made contemporaneously with the transactions and from first-hand knowledge.
23. "Merchants' books do not prove against persons who are not in trade, the
sale and delivery of the articles there entered." This article was taken from
Article 1329 of the Code Napoleon.
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chant's books may not be used to prove sale and delivery of
goods against one not a merchant. An 1824 case used Spanish
law to extend this rule by holding that a merchant's books are
inadmissible even against another merchant.24 Article 2244 of
the Code of 1825 combined this extended rule with the rule of
Article 231 of the 1808 Code2 5 that a merchant's books can be
offered in evidence against him if taken as a whole. Article
2244 of the 1825 Code is now Article 2248 of the Revised Civil
Code of 1870 and reads as follows:
"The books of merchants can not be given in evidence in
their favor; they are good evidence against them, but if used
as evidence, the whole must be taken together."
This article has been held inapplicable where the books offered
belong to a third party26 or where the books are not considered
those of a merchant. Early jurisprudence also established sev-
eral limitations or exceptions, 27 but the article was used many
24. Syndics of T. Johnston v. Breedlove, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 508 (La. 1824).
25. "Merchants' books are good evidence against the merchants themselves,
but whoever wishes to avail himself of that evidence, must admit the books to
prove what they contain contrary to his pretensions." This article was taken from
Article 1330 of the Code Napoleon.
26. Inventories taken by several persons not parties to the suit were held
admissible in Istrouma Mercantile Co. v. Northern Assur. Co. Ltd. of London,
183 La. 855, 165 So. 11 (1935), where the inventories were corroborated by each
other and by testimony. Books of a grocer not a party to the suit were held
admissible in Sturgis v. Imperial Hotel, 144 So. 268 (La. App. 1932). One may
use an insolvent's books to prove himself a creditor in a suit against other
creditors. Hernandez v. His Creditors, 15 La. Ann. 87 (1860). A certificate of
demand on a note signed by a notary was properly admitted under the general
rule that books of a deceased clerk are admissible. Lathrop v. Lawson, 5 La. Ann.
238 (1850) (cited common law authorities).
Where an employee keeps the books, the books are considered to be the books
of the employer and not the employee. Thus a bookkeeper may offer his employer's
books against the employer's interest even though the books were kept by the
bookkeeper. Didier v. Aug4, 15 La. Ann. 398 (1860). A passbook kept with a
merchant belongs to the customer who retains possession even though entries are
made by the merchant. Succession of McLaughlin, 14 La. Ann. 398 (1859).
Books belong to the defendant-employer though kept by the plaintiff's son. Rayne
v. David Taylor & Co., 12 La. Ann. 765 (1857).
Business records kept by a predecessor in business were held admissible in
Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160 La. 909,
107 So. 618 (1926).
27. A party may use his books to refresh his memory on the witness stand,
though the books themselves are inadmissible. Flower v. Downs, 6 La. Ann. 538(1851) ; Kendall v. Bean, 12 Rob. 407 (La. 1846) ; Morgan v. Bickle, 2 Mart.
(N.S.) 377 (La. 1824).
Partnership books are admissible against a partner because of the mutual
agent theory. John Calder & Co. v. Their Creditors, 47 La. Ann. 346 (1895);
Carpenter v. Camp, 39 La. Ann. 1024 (1887) ; Pratt v. McHatton, 11 La. Ann.
260 (1856) (the rule that partnership books are admissible for and against part-
ners applies only to entries made during the existence of the partnership) ; Armi-
stead v. Spring, 1 Rob. 568 (La. 1842) ; Jordan v. White, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 335 (La.
1826). In Succession of Magi, 107 La. 208, 31 So. 660 (1901), the court ad-
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times in the 1800's to exclude a merchant's books offered in his
favor.28
Louisiana courts apparently early recognized the harshness
of the rule,29 for no case of the present century has been found
which applies the first part of Article 2248 by excluding a mer-
chant's books offered in his favor. However, the latter portion
of Article 2248 stating that a merchant's records are admissible
against his interest seems still acceptable to the courts.30 In
every case in the 1900's holding a party's business records ad-
missible in his favor, Article 2248 has been ignored or dismissed
as inapplicable, for reasons which appear to be logically inade-
quate.31 A 1942 decision excluding business records was based
mitted books of a business run by the executor against one of the heirs under
the partnership rule.
A corporation's books are admissible to prove facts about ownership because
this is vital to its existence. Hincks v. Converse, 38 La. Ann. 871 (1886).
28. Brown v. Pike, 34 La. Ann. 576 (1882) ; Lyons v. Teal, 28 La. Ann. 592
(1876) ; Conery v. Hayes, 19 La. Ann. 325 (1867) ; Byrne, Vance & Co. v. Gray-
son, 15 La. Ann. 457 (1860) ; Porche v. LeBlanc, 12 La. Ann. 778 (1857) ; Ken-
dall v. Bean, 12 Rob. 407 (La. 1846).
29. See Herring v. Levy, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 383 (La. 1826), where a party's
books were held admissible in his favor because they were kept by a clerk who
had died before the trial. See also two early Louisiana cases using common law
regular entries rationale instead of Article 2244 as a basis for excluding books:
White v. Wilkinson, 12 La. Ann. 359 (1857) (a party's books were held in-
admissible because the entries were not made from actual knowledge of the
entrant) ; Herring v. Levy, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 383 (La. 1826) (extracts from books
introduced in a party's favor were held inadmissible). The court in the latter
case referred to the common law practice of admitting books kept by a clerk
deceased before the trial and stated that such should be the rule in Louisiana, but
that the rule should not be extended to extracts from books.
30. See Jennings v. Prejean, 216 La. 645, 44 So.2d 325 (1950) ; Hill v. Hill,
115 La. 490, 39 So. 503 (1905) ; Consolidated Companies v. Spinella, 181 So. 42
(La. App. 1938). For older Louisiana cases admitting business records against
one's interest, see New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Leeds & Co., 49 La.
Ann. 123, 21 So. 168 (1896) ; Southern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pike, 32 La. Ann. 483
(1880) ; Spears v. Spears, 27 La. Ann. 537 (1875) ; Didier v. Aug4, 15 La. Ann.
398 (1860) ; Parker v. Jonte, 15 La. Ann. 290 (1860) ; Hernandez v. His Credi-
tors, 15 La. Ann. 87 (1860) ; Succession of McLaughlin, 14 La. Ann. 398 (1859) ;
Rayne v. Taylor & Co., 12 La. Ann. 765 (1857) ; Donaldson v. Walker, 7 Rob.
329 (La. 1844) ; Marmiche v. Commagere, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 657 (La. 1828).
This same result is obtained at common law by exceptions to the hearsay
rule not peculiar to business records -declarations against interest and admis-
sions of a party - therefore, further discussion of this facet of Article 2248 is
outside the scope of this Comment.
31. In Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947), records concerning a large construction project were held admissible.
The court satisfied itself that the records were reliable and made the following
remark: "This court in recent years has greatly relaxed the stringent rule of
Article 2248, and under modern business methods to apply the rule would in many
instances work grave injustices." Id. at 12, 31 So.2d at 229.
In Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160 La.
909, 107 So. 618 (1926), carbon copies of warehouse receipts were held ad-
missible as proof of issuance of the originals. The court stated that Article 2248
of the Civil Code was inapplicable to facsimiles kept by warehousemen, without
elaborating further on the point.
In Shea v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 124 La. 299, 50 So. 166
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upon other reasoning, 32 although the same result could have
been obtained by applying Article 2248. It is submitted that
the rule in Article 2248, that a merchant's books are inadmissible
in his favor, has little, if any force in Louisiana today.
Louisiana Civil Cases - Modern Jurisprudence
Louisiana courts, in deciding questions of admissibility of
business records, have generally applied the reasoning of the
common law entries exception and shop book rule. However,
these rules have not been endorsed as a whole. It may prove
helpful to analyze the Louisiana cases in light of the elements
of the regular entries exception and shop book rule.
Necessity. To satisfy the necessity requirement of the com-
mon law regular entries exception it must be shown that the
entrant is unavailable for testimony.38  Louisiana cases support
this requirement.34 In many common law jurisdictions the neces-
(1909), the court held records of a large construction project admissible. Article
2248 was dismissed with the following statement: "Of course, the rule is that
a litigant's books are not admissible in evidence in his favor; but that rule is not
without its exceptions . . . . (After citing several common law sources, the court
continued] All these reports, etc., were made at a time unsuspicious, and for the
purpose of keeping a true and correct record. We think that, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, and in view of the practical impossibility of trying the
case in any other way, the court can accept the said exhibits as correct." Id. at
332, 50 So. at 177.
In Cascio v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 32 So.2d 66 (La. App. 1947),
the court held admissible a medical report by a company doctor who died before
the trial, citing American Jurisprudence as authority. Also mentioned was the
rule that in workmen's compensation cases the judge shall not be bound by tech-
nical rules of evidence. La. Acts 1926, No. 85. The rule of Article 2248 was not
mentioned.
In Royal Products v. Johnson, 191 So. 329 (La. App. 1939), the court held
the books admissible because the bookkeeper was insane. However, the records
were considered of insufficient weight to overcome denials of indebtedness by
the opposing party because the transaction could have been verified by other means.
The court stated: "The stringent provisions of Article 2248 of the Civil Code
have been relaxed in numerous cases and particularly in matters where the party
who made the book entries was either dead or incapable of giving testimony."
Id. at 330.
32. Britton v. Holloman Lumber Co., 7 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1942). The
court held a party's books inadmissible in his favor because they were incom-
plete and not properly kept. Article 2248 was not mentioned.
33. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 204, 366-69, §§ 1421, 1521 (3d ed. 1940). All
persons concerned with recording a transaction must be shown to be unavailable
for testimony for some good reason such as death, insanity, illness, or absence
from the jurisdiction.
34. Several Louisiana cases have excluded business records because the entrant
was available for testimony: Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 185 La.
924, 171 So. 78 (1936) (records of drawbridge tenders were held inadmissible
because the entrants testified at the trial; therefore their testimony was avail-
able) ; Receivership of Dugdamonia Shingle & Lumber Co., 118 La. 242, 42 So.
789 (1907) (books of a receivership were held inadmissible in favor of the re-
ceiver because the bookkeeper should have testified) ; Daniels v. Union Oil Mills,
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sity requirement may be satisfied by showing mercantile incon-
venience - where the burden upon modern business organiza-
tions of producing all the employees concerned with recording
a transaction would outweigh the value of such testimony.35 This
principle seems to have been recognized in a Louisiana case
admitting in evidence records of a large construction project 6
In the Uniform Rules of Evidence,3 7 and the Model Code of
Evidence,"8 the necessity requirement has been abandoned com-
pletely.
Contemporaneousness of the entry with the transaction.
Louisiana courts have recognized the fact that reliability is
enhanced if entries are made at or near the time of the trans-
action."9 The regular entries exception and the shop book rule
require that the entry and the fact recorded be sufficiently con-
nected in time to suggest reliability.40 In addition, the entry
must have been made from personal knowledge or from informa-
tion furnished by one having a business duty to observe and re-
port the facts recorded. 41
Business duty. A Louisiana workmen's compensation case
Inc., 161 So. 614 (La. App. 1935) (coroner's report was held inadmissible where
coroner could have been produced at the trial).
However, Louisiana courts have admitted business records where the entrant
was unavailable. In Cascio v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 32 So.2d 66 (La.
App. 1947), a medical report by a company physician who died before the trial
was held admissible in evidence in a workmen's compensation suit where the
physician's signature was identified by another company doctor. In Royal Products,
Inc. v. Johnson, 191 So. 329 (La. App. 1939), books were held admissible where
the bookkeeper was insane at the time of the trial. However, they were given very
little weight because the transaction could have been verified by other means.
35. See McCoaRmcx, EVIDENCE 606, § 288 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
368, § 1521 (3d ed. 1940).
36. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947). The court admitted job sheets which were daily summaries of job
cards. The job cards were made by laborers punching time clocks and many other
persons. The job cards were destroyed in the regular course of business without
fraud; therefore the company had no other means of proof than the job sheets
or testimony of many different workers. The bookkeeper testified at the trial as
to the -bookkeeping procedure, but could not testify from first-hand knowledge
concerning the facts recorded.
37. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(13).
38. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942).
39. In Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947), the court held admissible records of a large construction project and
emphasized the fact that the records were made daily from supporting memoranda
made by the individual workers. See notes 31 and 36 supra. In Shea v. Sewerage
& Water Board of New Orleans, 124 La. 299, 50 So. 166 (1909), the court held
admissible records concerning a large construction project and mentioned that
the records were made at an "unsuspicious" time. See note 31 supra.
40. See McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE 601, § 285 (1954) ; 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 375,
405, §§ 1526, 1550 (3d ed. 1940).
41. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 602-03, § 286 (1954); 5 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE
376-91, 408-10, §§ 1530, 1555 (3d ad. 1940).
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mentioned the presence of a professional duty to record and
report as a basis for admitting a medical report.42 A business
duty to a third person to do the act and record it is not required
in jurisdictions within the United States, as it is in England,
but its presence is recognized as tending to increase circum-
stantial probability of trustworthiness. 43
Regular course of business. The requirement that the rec-
ords be kept in the regular course of business is perhaps the
most difficult element to define. The scope of the term "busi-
ness" has been expanded by some common law courts in recent
years to cover records of non-profit institutions, as well as rec-
ords kept in the regular course of a profession, though many
still adhere to a narrower definition. 44 From Louisiana cases
admitting hospital records, 45 it might be inferred that Louisiana
courts would accept a broad definition today, though older cases
have excluded hospital records. 46 The "regularity" element of
the regular entries exception defies useful definition, except
to say that casual, isolated entries are excluded.4 7 No reported
Louisiana cases have held records inadmissible because they were
not in the regular course of business. The following records,
have been held admissible, but the regular course of business
element was not mentioned: hospital records, 4 daily summaries
of records of large construction projects,9 and carbon copies of
warehouse receipts. 50
42. Cascio v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 32 So.2d 66, 68 (La. App.
1947). In holding admissible the medical report by a company physician, the
court said: "This report was made by the deceased doctor in the discharge of his
professional duties and was admissible in evidence."
43. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 598-99, § 283 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
872-73, § 1524 (3d ed. 1940).
44. See note 43 supra.
45. Succession of Holland, 236 La. 8, 106 So.2d 697 (1958). The court used
hospital records to determine whether treatment had caused the decedent to become
legally incapable of making a will. In Shepard v. Whitney National Bank, 177
So. 825 (La. App. 1938), the court admitted the history portion of a hospital
record as proof of the statements made therein. LA. R.S. 13:3714 (1950), apply-
ing to charity hospital records, was mentioned, but the decision was not based
upon this statute because the records in this case were not state charity hospital
records.
46. Gaines v. Acme Industrial Life Ins. Soc., 155 So. 276 (La. App. 1934)
Williams v. Locicero, 142 So. 856 (La. App. 1932) ; Dolan v. Metropolitan Life
Ins., 123 So. 379 (La. App. 1929).
47. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 603-05, § 287 (1954) ; 5 WIDMOaE, EVIDENCE 373-
75, § 1525 (3d ed. 1940).
48. Succession of Holland, 236 La. 8, 106 So.2d 697 (1958); Shepard v.
Whitney National Bank, 177 So. 825 (La. App. 1938). See note 45 supra.
49. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947) ; Shea v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 124 La. 299, 50
So. 166 (1909). See notes 31, 36, and 39 supra.
50. Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160 La.
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Honest appearance of books and motive to misrepresent. A
Louisiana court, in a suit for wages due, excluded books of a
party who had a reputation for not paying workers promptly
because the books were incomplete and were inadequately kept.51
A case holding records admissible mentioned that the records
themselves and the circumstances under which they were made
were "unsuspicious. ' '52 Similar requirements under the shop
book rule and the regular entries exception are that the books
must bear an honest appearance,53 and that the existence of a
strong, fairly positive counter motive to misrepresent will be
reason for exclusion.14
Production of original records. Copies may be used only if
the original cannot be produced as determined by the ordinary
rules relating to written evidence.5 5 Thus an early Louisiana
case held extracts from business records inadmissible. 56 How-
ever, carbon copies of warehouse receipts have been held admis-
sible as proof of issuance of the originals.5 7
The question under the regular entries exception as to which
books or records in a bookkeping system should be introduced
is governed by the rule that the first regular and collected record
is proper.5 Thus a journal or book of original entry may be
introduced without having to account for any scattered support-
ing memoranda. Two Louisiana cases hold admissible summaries
of daily records of large construction projects where it would be
physically impossible for the court to examine all supporting
memoranda, 59 or where the supporting memoranda were de-
stroyed in the regular course of business and without fraud.
6 0
Identification of records at the trial. No technical require-
ments as to who should identify the records at the trial have
been developed at common law, but the elaborate foundation
909, 107 So. 618 (1926). See note 31 supra.
51. Britton v. Holloman Lumber Co., 7 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1942). See note
32 supra.
52. Shea v. Sewerage & Water Board, 124 La. 299, 50 So. 166 (1909). See
notes 31 and 39 supra.
53. See 5 WIaMoBE, EVIDENCE 405-06, § 1551 (3d ed. 1940).
54. See id. at 375, § 1527.
55. See id. at 393, 414, §§ 1532, 1558.
56. Herring v. Levy, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 383 (La. 1826). See note 29 supra.
57. Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160
La. 909, 107 So. 618 (1926). See note 31 8upra.
58. See 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 412-14, § 1558 (3d ed. 1940).
59. Shea v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 124 La. 299, 50 So.
166 (1909). See notes 31 and 39 supra.
60. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947). See notes 31, 36, and 39 supra.
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necessary for admission under the regular entries exception
requires explanation by one familiar with the record-keeping
procedure. The Uniform Rules of Evidence provision requires
explanation of the entries and the circumstances surrounding
their making by the custodian or other qualified witness."'
Business records admitted in Louisiana cases have been identi-
fied and explained by the chief bookkeeper of a large organiza-
tion,62 and by the records custodian.
3
Records of a third party. Properly applied, the common law
regular entries exception treats records of third parties no dif-
ferently from other records.34 Louisiana cases have admitted
records of third parties without mentioning any restrictions. 65
These Louisiana decisions do not openly declare a special cate-
gory for books of third parties nor do they elaborate on this
point. The most that can be said is perhaps that Louisiana courts
will be more liberal in admitting in evidence records of third
parties.
Conclusion
The modern Louisiana cases can be summarized as follows.
Records of industrial and commercial organizations, as well as
medical reports and hospital records are admissible as proof
of their assertions if: (1) persons concerned with recording
the information are unavailable for testimony, or production
of such persons would be a needless burden; (2) the first col-
lected record available to or usable by the court is introduced;
61. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(13).
62. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Development, 212 La. 1, 31 So.2d
226 (1947). See notes 31, 36, and 39 supra.
63. Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160
La. 909, 107 So. 618 (1926). See note 31 supra.
64. See 5 WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE 349, §1518 (3d ed. 1940) : "It was understood
to cover all entries made 'by a person, since deceased, in the ordinary course of
his business', whether a person wholly unconnected with the parties, or the clerk
of a party, or the party himself; and it is this general exception that to-day is
universally recognized."
65. Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 160 La.
909, 107 So. 618 (1926) (facsimiles of warehouse receipts held admissible as
proof of issuance of the originals) ; Hernandez v. His Creditors, 15 La. Ann. 87
(1860) (one may use an insolvent's books to prove himself a creditor) ; Oxnard
v. Locke, 13 La. 447 (1839) (auctioneer's books were held admissible where the
auctioneer died before the trial) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Quin, 92 So.2d 303 (La.
App. 1957) ; Brackvitch v. Checker Cab Co., 79 So.2d 920 (La. App. 1955);
Alpaugh v. Krajcer, 57 So.2d 700 (La. App. 1952) (records of repairmen held
admissible in support of plaintiff's testimony) ; Sturgis v. Imperial Hotel, 144
So. 268 (La. App. 1932) (books of grocer not a party to the suit held admissible
to corroborate plaintiff's testimony). In none of the above cases were any tests
for reliability or necessity mentioned.
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(3) the records are identified at the trial by one familiar with
the bookkeeping procedure; and (4) the evidence seems reliable
after considering such factors as (a) contemporaneousness of
the entry with the occurrence or fact recorded, (b) first-hand
knowledge of the entrant, (c) existence of a business or pro-
fessional duty to record or report the facts in the regular course
of business, (d) completeness and honest appearance of the
books, (e) absence of fraud in making the entries or in destroy-
ing the supporting memoranda, and (f) perhaps, whether the
books belong to a third party. Also, a merchant's books are
admissible in evidence against him. The above is a summary
rather than a rule because the cases have been decided in ap-
parent isolation from each other and the opinions have not
attempted to define a comprehensive standard for admissibility
of business records. Individual elements of the regular entries
exception and shop book rule have been used as bases for in-
dividual decisions, yet neither of these common law rules has
been endorsed substantially and openly by the courts. Also, a
literal interpretation of the Code of Criminal Procedure or of
Article 2248 of the Civil Code would limit the above summary
by making it inapplicable in criminal cases or to books of mer-
chants. Therefore, it can be said that uncertainty reigns in this
area by the law.
The lack of a certain body of principles and rules to deter-
mine admissibility of business records in Louisiana in both
criminal and civil cases points up the need for legislation in
this area. Modern patterns for such legislation exist within the
United States. Widespread criticism of the regular entries ex-
ception as being harsh and unrealistic under modern business
conditions66 has led to several reform proposals which have en-
joyed fairly widespread acceptance.67 All these proposals elimi-
66. E.g., MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 606-09, § 289 (1954) ; 5 WIGMOmE, EVIDENCE
361-66, § 1520 (3d ed. 1940) ; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV.
113, 121 (1921).
67. In 1927 a model act was published by the Commonwealth Fund of New
York which later served as a starting point for the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act, published in 1936 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The Uniform Act reads as follows (Sections 3, 4, and 5
dealing with uniformity of interpretation, short title, and repeal are omitted):
"Section 1. Definition. - The term "business" shall include every kind of
business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not.
"Sec. 2. Business Records -A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in
so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified wit-
ness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made
in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
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nate the requirements of showing unavailability of the persons
concerned with recording the transaction"8 and allow the trial
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and
time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."
Rule 514 of the Model Code of Evidence published in 1942 by the American
Law Institute is very similar and reads as follows:
"Rule 514, Business Entries and the Like
"(1) A writing offered as a memorandum or record of an act, event or con-
dition is admissible as tending to prove the occurrence of the act or event or
the existence of the conditon if the judge finds that it was made in the regular
course of a business and that it was the regular course of that business for one
with personal knowledge of such an act, event or condition to make such a
memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such
a memorandum or record, and for the memorandum or record to be made at or
about the time of the act, event or condition or within a reasonable time there-
after.
"(2) Evidence of the absence of a memorandum or record of an asserted act,
event or condition from the memoranda or records of a business is admissible as
tending to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event or the non-existence of the
condition in that business, if the judge finds that it was the regular course of that
business to make such memoranda of all such acts, events, or conditions at the time
thereof or within a reasonable time thereafter, and to preserve them.
"(3) The word business as used in Paragraphs (1) and (2) includes every
kind of occupation and regular organized activity, whether conducted for profit
or not."
See also UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(13), 63(14).
An interesting mixture of the language of the Uniform Act and the Model
Code, supplemented by clarification of ambiguities revealed by cases interpreting
modern legislation, was adopted by Texas in 1951. This statute is discussed in
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 608-09, § 289 (1954); and Ray, Business Records - A
Proposed Rule of Admissibility, 5 Sw. L.J. 33 (1951). The Texas statute reads
as follows :
TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 3737e (Supp. 1951) : "Section 1. A memorandum
or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar as relevant, be competent
evidence of the occurrence of the act or event or the existence of the condition
if the judge finds that:
"a. It was made in the regular course of business;
"b. It was the regular course of that business for an employee or representa-
tive of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition to
make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be in-
cluded in such memorandum or record;
"c. It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
"Section 2. The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or
record in accordance with the provisions of paragraph one (1) may be proved by
the testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified witness even though
he may not have personal knowledge as to the various items or contents of such
memorandum or record. Such lack of personal knowledge may be shown to affect
the weight and credibility of the memorandum or record but shall not affect its
admissibility.
"Section 3. Evidence to the effect that the records of a business do not contain
any memorandum or record of an alleged act, event or condition shall be com-
petent to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event or the non-existence of the
condition in that business if the judge finds that it was the regular course of that
business to make such memoranda or records of all such acts, events or conditions
at the time or within reasonable time thereafter and to preserve them.
"Section 4. 'Business' as used in this Act includes any and every kind of
regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not. (Acts 1951, 52nd
Leg., p. 345, ch. 321.)"
68. Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 F.2d 660, 667 (3d Cir. 1947);
Hofman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 985 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
See 2 JONES, EVIDENCE 558, § 294 (5th ed. 1958) ; Green, The Model and Uni-
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judge wide discretion in determining whether the records are
sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Business is defined broadly
enough to include commercial, industrial, professional, and non-
profit activities. It is submitted that Louisiana should consider
future legislation in order to provide a guide for admitting busi-
ness records, thereby eliminating much of the uncertainty in
this area of Louisiana law.
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
Real Rights in Louisiana
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the nature of
the real right in Louisiana in the light of the Civil Code, the
Louisiana jurisprudence, and French and common law materials.
The real right in France is apparently seen as a right held
by one person against all other persons in the world,' with the
object of the right being the thing upon which it is exercised.
As a correlative to the right, all persons owe an obligation to
abstain from disturbing the holder of the right in his enjoyment
of it. An example is the right of ownership. The owner of prop-
erty has a right against all men that they should abstain from
disturbing him in the exercise of his ownership. This right can
be asserted against all the world, and thus the owner can be said
to have rights of pursuit of the property into the hands of ad-
verse possessors, and preference over any ordinary creditor of
the possessor. Under French law, then, the rights of pursuit and
preference are the two major advantages that the holder of any
real right has over the holder of a mere personal right or right
of credit.2
The real right in Louisiana as explained in the Civil Code is
not quite so comprehensive, however. Though the Code does not
deal specifically with real rights, it is clear that the real right is
a necessary correlative of the real obligation, which is defined
as any obligation attached to immovable property.3 The char-
acteristics of a real obligation, and consequently of a real right,
form Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31. TUL. L. REV. 49, 54
(1956).
1. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 2160 (1959).
2. Id. § 2165.
3. LA. Civir, CODE art. 2010 (1870).
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